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ABSTRACT 
 The Renewable Fuel Standard has helped to increase the amount of biofuels consumed in 
the United States while also contributing to increased grain/oilseed price volatility. The nested 
structure created values biofuels differently based on arbitrary characteristics. Biodiesel has been 
an important biofuel for blenders dealing with mandate compliance in both 2011 and 2013. In 
2011, increased sugarcane ethanol prices forced increased biodiesel demand and hence prices, 
resulting in biodiesel exceeding its mandate for the first time and competing for the remainder of 
the advanced biofuel mandate. Similarly, in 2013 excess biodiesel was utilized to help breach the 
ethanol blend wall causing RIN prices to converge. In both years it caused short term excess 
biodiesel plant profit as they took advantage of higher prices while input costs were not 
increased as rapidly.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
 The purpose of this paper is to provide a basic framework for understanding U.S. biofuel 
mandates under the rubric of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) which are extremely 
complicated and widely misunderstood by the public and economists who study them. We 
explain simply how the nested structure creates interactions between mandates and the various 
biofuels used for compliance, essentially creating a handbook on how to understand the 
mandates and what interactions have occurred and what is likely to again. Additionally, the RFS 
is directly responsible for emerging world biofuel trade patterns and impacts how domestic 
blenders bid up biofuels and crop inputs that are used in production. While many economists 
view the RFS as a consumption mandate, we clearly show that a blend mandate is the proper way 
to model them and show how the blend wall only came into effect in 2013 and how blenders 
avoided the cliff. 
The nested structure of the U.S. mandate also has implications for corn-ethanol and corn 
prices, and trade in both ethanol (including two-way trade with Brazil) and biodiesel. So prices 
of both biofuels and three main feed stocks: corn, soybean and canola oil, and sugarcane (and 
hence sugar) are being affected by the way in which the complex U.S. RFS mandate works. And 
the primary driver since early 2013 has been the ethanol blend wall in the United States and 
more recently, the uncertainty in the EPA’s final ruling for 2014 (which at the time of writing, 
has still not been resolved), both having implications for the way forward in 2014 and beyond. 
But the volatility of grain-oilseed prices have been greatly impacted by this mandate structure in 
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2011 and now again since 2013 so using accepted price prediction models by de Gorter, Drabik, 
and Timilsina (2013) we will try to unravel why they do not always work as intended. 
Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is broken into 3 chapters to help the reader build up their understanding of the 
Renewable Fuel Standard and how it impacts different fuel markets and how they are 
economically modelled. We begin in Chapter 2 by briefly reviewing the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) rulemaking regarding the RFS and how different biofuels are classified 
within the mandates. We will show how the four mandate categories interact and the particular 
spill over pathways that exist. In addition, the EPA is required to implement the annual quantities 
for each of the four mandates defined above by specifying blend ratios for the amount of 
renewable fuel blended with each of gasoline and diesel. We look at different methods of 
calculating ethanol and biodiesel blend ratios and the confusion that stems from the RFS 
structure. We also look at how renewable identification numbers (RINs) are utilized for 
compliance of each blender’s RFS obligations and their multiplication factors that can lead to 
certain biofuels being preferred.  
 Chapter 3 considers why 2013 is an important time period for reaching the 10 percent 
ethanol limit in gasoline (i.e., the blend wall) resulting from the RFS and how the market 
accordingly priced RINs. We start by building a simplified model of the blend wall according to 
conventional research and the opportunities for expanding research in this area moving forward. 
While the simple blend wall does not fully explain the complexities of the RFS, it is an important 
starting point to see how economists differ on how it can and will be breached. Finally, we show 
how the nested structure that was explained in Chapter 2 allows the blend wall to be breached by 
biofuel blenders by using their least cost method utilizing several paths of compliance.  
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 In Chapter 4, we are able to bring together all the understanding of the blend wall and 
RFS to help explain model errors in established price prediction models. It is important to first 
explain the advanced biofuel mandate interactions between biodiesel and Brazilian sugarcane 
ethanol during 2011 where the nested structure of the RFS occurs for the first time. 
Understanding this time period is vital moving forward to 2013 when the blend wall occurs and 
the interaction that now encompasses biodiesel and corn ethanol in the renewable fuel gap. These 
interactions show up in market prices of biofuels as it drives demand resulting in RIN prices 
converging. The interactions are not necessarily a bad thing1, it just shows that the RFS is 
working as designed.  
 Understanding the Renewable Fuel Standard in the United States is an important first step 
in understanding how biofuels are chosen by fuel blenders to be utilized in the nations fuel 
supply. This paper took a very complex government program and attempted to simplify it into an 
easy to use guide and help explain past model errors.  
 
  
                                                 
1 Clearly biofuel prices are increased due to the RFS increasing demand for biofuels, but as a policy goal of 
increasing biofuel consumption in the U.S. it is inevitable that this is the case. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPLAINING THE COMPLEX STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. BIOFUEL MANDATES 
Overview of the Mandate Structure  
U.S. biofuel mandates under the rubric of the Renewable Fuel Standard (hereafter the 
RFS) are extremely complicated.2 Four broad categories of biofuel mandates are specified: 
biomass based diesel (BBD), cellulosic biofuels, advanced biofuels, and total renewable fuel. 
Each category is defined by two criteria: biomass based diesel (mostly biodiesel from vegetable 
oils and animal fats) versus not (mostly ethanol)3, and a minimum level of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions reduction relative to the fossil fuel (gasoline or diesel) it is assumed to 
replace.4 For example, corn ethanol only qualifies for the total renewable fuel mandate and is 
required to reduce GHG emissions 20 percent relative to gasoline.  
These alternative biofuels are to be blended with either gasoline or diesel. The first two 
categories (BBD and cellulosic) are nested within the advanced biofuel mandate, with the latter 
nested within the total renewable fuel standard. All listed biofuels qualify for the overall total 
renewable fuel mandate. In governing the mandated use of alternative renewable fuels, EISA 
2007 establishes the annual volumes of each of these alternative renewable fuels that must be 
                                                 
2 The RFS is under the Clean Air Act Section 211 (o) as amended by the Energy Independence and 
Security Act (EISA) of 2007 (EISA, 2007). 
3 We assume in this paper that all biofuels are used in transportation. Biogas, cellulosic biodiesel (heating 
oil) and naphtha are not used in transportation but their levels to date have been minuscule and so can be 
ignored. 
4 Biofuels themselves are net zero as recognized by the IPCC (2008) (the GHGs absorbed in growing the 
crop are emitted in burning the fuel – see de Gorter and Just (2008) for a comprehensive discussion). But 
GHGs are emitted in the production and distribution of biofuels from field to fuel tank, as measured by 
“life-cycle accounting”. 
5 
blended with either gasoline or diesel. Eligible biofuels are not just biodiesel and ethanol, but 
also include renewable diesel, naphtha, biobutanol, biogas, and biogasoline.  
This chapter is outlined as follows. We begin by briefly reviewing the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) rulemaking regarding the RFS and how different biofuels are classified 
within the mandates. We will show how the four mandate categories interact and the particular 
spill over pathways that exist. In addition, the EPA is required to implement the annual quantities 
for each of the four mandates defined above by specifying blend ratios for the amount of 
renewable fuel blended with each of gasoline and diesel. We also look at how renewable 
identification numbers (RINs) are utilized for compliance of each blender’s RFS obligations and 
their multiplication factors that can lead to certain biofuels being preferred. Finally, we consider 
why 2013 is an important time period for reaching the 10 percent ethanol limit in gasoline (i.e., 
the blend wall) resulting from the RFS and how the market accordingly priced RINs.  
The General Structure of U.S. Biofuel Mandates  
The structure of the RFS is remarkably complex with nested mandates based on GHG 
emission reductions and source or type of biofuel. Each mandate is a specific volume of a biofuel 
for each year. Figure 2.1 is a heuristic summary of the total renewable fuel standard.5 The total 
renewable fuel mandate includes all possible types of domestically consumed biofuels and 
requires a minimum 20 percent reduction in GHG emission. Within the total renewable fuel 
mandate, there is an advanced biofuel mandate that requires a minimum 50 percent reduction in 
GHG emissions. The advanced mandate has two specific mandates within it: a biomass-based 
diesel (BBD) mandate,
6 and cellulosic biofuels (not only ethanol and biodiesel but also cellulosic 
                                                 
5 Circle size is not representative of biofuel volume produced in that category. 
6 There are two types of biodiesel that need to be defined that fall under the biomass-based diesel 
mandate. Biodiesel is made from trans-esterification while renewable diesel is made by at least three other 
processes and it includes recycled vegetable oils and animal fats. Unlike biodiesel, renewable diesel has 
6 
gasoline and cellulosic diesel).7 But cellulosic biofuels require a 60 percent saving in GHG 
emissions.  
 
Once each of the inner mandates for advanced biofuels are satisfied in Figure 2.1, any 
spillover or ‘overage’ can compete with other advanced biofuels without explicit mandates (e.g., 
sugarcane ethanol from Brazil is the major type of biofuel that fills the advanced mandate 
outside the biofuels qualifying for each of the two inner mandates) to fill the residual of the 
advanced biofuel mandate.8 As soon as the advanced mandate is filled, advanced biofuel 
‘overage’ starts counting towards the total renewable fuel mandate. The difference between the 
advanced biofuels mandate and the total renewable fuel mandate is known as the ‘renewable fuel 
                                                 
the same chemical properties as diesel and its equivalence values vary between 1.5 and 1.7. Through the 
remainder of the paper biodiesel will refer to all types of biodiesel including renewable diesel. 
7 The entire circle includes every biofuel within it. If a gallon of biodiesel is blended, it counts towards 
the BBD mandate, but also to the advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel mandates (but with a 
multiplier of 1.5 to the latter two mandates – we discuss this later). 
8 Sugarcane ethanol is also vital for meeting California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) so even if 
the advanced biofuel standard was met with biodiesel, sugarcane ethanol would still be imported to help 
fulfil the LCFS. 
Source: Derived from various EPA RIN generation data (http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/rfsdata/2010emts.htm)
Figure 2.1. The Nested Structure of the RFS up to 2010
Total Renewable Fuel 
Mandate
Advanced Biofuel 
Mandate
Biomass-based 
Diesel Mandate
1.5 factor
Cellulosic Biofuel 
Mandate
RFS Residual ("Renewable Fuel Gap" 
mostly corn-ethanol)
Advanced Residual 
(mostly sugarcane-
ethanol)
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gap’ which can be filled with any biofuel that meets the 20 percent GHG reduction threshold 
(Meyer, Schmidhuber, & Barreiro-Hurle, 2013).   
All biofuels currently being consumed in the United States are therefore advanced except 
for corn ethanol and other extremely low amounts of biofuels like some non-ester renewable 
diesel that reduces less than 50 percent GHG (and even some BBD). There are really only three 
“explicit” mandates in the United States: that for BBD, cellulosic biofuels and total renewable 
fuel. In other words, if cellulosic biofuel consumption went beyond the total renewable fuel 
mandate, the BBD mandate is the only other mandate that has to be filled regardless (and vice-
versa). While no other type of biofuel can meet this category, cellulosic biofuels could, in 
principle, meet the entire total renewable fuel standard if at least the mandate was met for BBD. 
There is no corn ethanol mandate per se – it qualifies for the renewable fuel gap as the residual 
represented by the green area in Figure 2.1 although even that can in theory be filled by 
‘overage’ of any advanced biofuel. However, prior to 2013, only corn ethanol has been counted 
towards the renewable fuel gap and Figure 2.1 allows easy understanding of blenders RFS 
compliance in the United States.9 
Although corn ethanol had the renewable fuel gap easily filled until 2013, it does not 
mean that within the advanced biofuel mandate that there were no interactions. Figure 2.2 shows 
how blenders complied with the RFS during 2011 and 2012 as the BBD mandate was exceeded 
for the first time and created spillover into the advanced residual gap. We will show in this and 
later chapters how biofuel policy and world biofuel prices created the opportunity for blenders to 
choose between importing Brazilian sugarcane ethanol and domestic biodiesel. Even though 
                                                 
9 There have been minor amounts of other biofuels that did not meet GHG emissions reduction 
requirements for the other mandates to count under the total renewable fuel standard. 
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BBD was competing with sugarcane ethanol for the advanced residual, there was no significant 
spillover into the renewable fuel gap and competing with corn ethanol. 
 
But beginning in 2013 advanced biofuel overage spilled into the total renewable fuel 
mandate as shown in Figure 2.3, displacing corn ethanol, which is instead mostly exported. The 
figure shows that BBD filled the entire advanced mandate alone and pushed sugarcane ethanol 
into the renewable fuel gap. This occurred because of the ethanol “blend wall” where cars are 
limited to a maximum blend ratio of 10 percent. The economics of the blend wall is an issue we 
take up in greater detail in the next chapter but the impact of spillage was to equalize RIN prices. 
But first we have to explain more details of the mandates like the types of biofuels and the GHG 
emissions reduction requirements, the ethanol equivalence factors associated with each biofuel as 
everything is measured in terms of ethanol equivalent gallons, and the categories of “renewable 
identification numbers” (RINs) that are used to ensure compliance of the mandates (Cornell 
University Law School, 2013a). To this we now turn, step by step.  
Source: Derived from EPA RIN generation data (http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/rfsdata/2012emts.htm)
Figure 2.2. The Nested Structure of the RFS during 2011/2012
Advanced Biofuel 
Mandate
Cellulosic Biofuel 
Mandate
Biomass-based 
Diesel 
Production
Biomass-based 
Diesel Mandate
RFS Residual ("Renewable Fuel Gap" 
corn-ethanol & some sugarcane-ethanol)
Total Renewable Fuel 
Mandate
Advanced Residual 
(some sugarcane-
ethanol)
1.5 factor
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The different biofuels that fall under each mandate are shown in Table 2.1. The first 
column lists most of the biofuel types that are being counted towards the RFS. BBD can be ester-
based diesel (e.g., from soybean oil) or non-ester renewable diesel (e.g., from cellulosic 
feedstock’s) which can be used as a transportation fuel, a transportation fuel additive, heating oil, 
or as a jet fuel (Schnepf & Yacobucci, 2013).10 Cellulosic biofuels can produce biodiesel and 
biogasoline from feedstocks such as corn stover, miscanthus, switch grass, forest residues, or 
short rotation woody crops. Advanced biofuels require GHG reduction of 50 percent as shown in 
column 2 of Table 2.1 and includes overage from cellulosic and BBD as well as sugarcane 
ethanol, naphtha, biobutanol, and biogas. Any biofuel that qualifies with 20 percent GHG 
reduction fits under the total renewable fuel standard, which is mainly corn ethanol. 
                                                 
10 Consequently, when calculating the blend ratio for motor fuels later, the data has to be adjusted to 
account for consumption outside motor fuels. 
Source: Derived from EPA RIN generation data (http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/rfsdata/2013emts.htm)
Figure 2.3. The Nested Structure of the RFS during 2013
Advanced Biofuel Mandate 
(no residual: all biomass-
based diesel & more)
Cellulosic 
Biofuel Mandate
1.5 factor
Biomass-
based Diesel 
Production
Total Renewable Fuel 
Mandate RFS Residual ("Renewable Fuel Gap" - all corn- & 
sugarcane-ethanol and some biomass-based diesel)
Biomass-based 
Diesel Mandate
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It is important to realize that depending on plant production methods and inputs used, 
biofuels may count towards different mandates.11 For example, certain plants producing non-
ester renewable diesel can only count towards the advanced mandate or the total renewable fuel 
mandate (e.g., using coal as a conversion source) (Schnepf & Yacobucci, 2013). 
Table 2.1. Classifying Biofuels       
Biofuel Type 
GHG 
Reductiona 
Equivalence 
Value 
RIN 
Categoryb 
Biomass-based diesel (BBD) Mandate 50%  D4 
Biodiesel  1 (1.5)c  
Non-ester renewable diesel  1 (1.5-1.7)c  
Cellulosic Biofuel Mandate 60%   
Biogasoline  1.5 D3 
Biodiesel  1.7 D7 
Advanced Biofuel Mandate 50%  D5 
Sugarcane ethanol  1  
Naphtha  1.5  
Biobutanol  1.3  
Biogas  1  
Renewable Fuel Gapd 20%  D6 
Corn Ethanol   1   
a Biofuels within each mandate must reduce GHG by that amount over diesel or gasoline. 
b Renewable identification numbers (RINs) are the EPAs compliance categories and will be discussed later in the 
chapter. 
c Numbers in parentheses reflect equivalence values for the advanced and total renewable fuels mandates. 
d Calculated by subtracting the advanced mandate from the total renewable mandate. 
Source: Adapted from EISA 2007 
The third column of Table 2.1 gives the ethanol equivalence value attributed to each 
gallon of biofuel consumed for each type of biofuel. The EPA requires each gallon of biofuel to 
be defined in terms of an ethanol equivalent gallon, where the equivalence value differs from 1 
to reflect differential energy content (EPA, 2013). Ethanol has an equivalence value of 1 
                                                 
11 Grandfathered plants that were built before December 19, 2007 are exempt from the 20 percent 
lifecycle GHG threshold requirement. However, any new expansion at existing plants must achieve the 20 
percent reduction threshold (Schnepf & Yacobucci, 2013). 
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regardless of the feedstock source (e.g., corn or sugarcane) even though it can apply to different 
mandates. The EPA creates equivalence values for biofuels based on the different energy content 
compared to ethanol and the type of inputs (e.g., proportion of renewable feedstock and energy 
conversion source) (EPA, 2013).12 
As we showed above, the BBD mandate is composed of both biodiesel and non-ester 
renewable diesel although we refer to the overall category as BBD. The BBD standard is the 
only mandate given in actual volume; not in ethanol equivalence terms. This means a gallon of 
BBD counts differently towards its own mandate compared to the remainder of the advanced 
biofuel mandate and the renewable fuel gap (Cornell University Law School, 2013b). Ester-
based biodiesel has an equivalence value of 1 towards its own mandate but 1.5 towards the 
advanced and total renewable fuel mandates. Non-ester renewable diesel has an equivalence 
value of 1 to the BBD mandate and a range between 1.5 and 1.7 for the advanced mandate, 
depending on the how it was produced: the type of feedstock (e.g., soybean oil or palm oil) or 
fuel used in its production (e.g., natural gas or coal). This means that even when ester-based 
biodiesel (non-ester renewable diesel) is blended exactly at the mandated volume it will actually 
generate 1.5 (1.5-1.7) times the compliance volume towards the advanced and total renewable 
mandate, respectively.13  
Within the cellulosic biofuel mandate, biogasoline and biodiesel have equivalence values 
of 1.5 and 1.7, respectively. This means each gallon of cellulosic biogasoline counts 1.5 times 
towards the cellulosic mandate, the advanced biofuel mandate and the total renewable fuel 
standard. It is important to note that cellulosic biodiesel blended under the cellulosic biofuel 
mandate does not count towards the BBD mandate. By 2022, 16 billion gallons (BG) of 
                                                 
12 http://www.afdc.energy.gov/fuels/fuel_comparison_chart.pdf 
13 This manifests itself as a Renewable Identification Number to be discussed later. 
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cellulosic biofuels are required and since that is in ethanol equivalent, if the entire amount was 
biogasoline,14 the actual volume needed would be 10.67 BG (EISA, 2007).  
The annual required consumption for each mandate from 2007 to 2022 is given in Table 
2.2 as mandated by EISA (EISA, 2007). For example, in 2022, the total volume of biofuels 
mandated in ethanol equivalent gallons is 36 BG. The renewable fuel gap includes corn ethanol 
and is capped in 2015 at 15 BG. BBD was originally intended to be at least 1 BG but it was 
revised upwards in 2013 to 1.28 BG due to biodiesel production capacity exceeding this level by 
500 million ethanol equivalent gallons. The major source of growth in biofuels was expected to 
come from cellulosic biofuels (16 BG in 2022). This appears to have been optimistic at best and 
the issues associated with not filling the cellulosic mandate will be discussed in the next sections.  
The discussion on the EPA adjusting the yearly volumes will take place in a later chapter but for 
now we will assume the schedule is identical as that laid out in Table 2.2. 
  
                                                 
14 Mandated Volume (16 BG) divided by Equivalence Factor (1.5 for bio-gasoline) equals 10.67 BG 
actual gallons 
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Table 2.2. The Mandated Volumes as originally created by EISA 2007 
Year 
Advanced 
Biofuel 
Cellulosic 
Biofuela 
Biomass-based 
Diesel 
Other 
Advancedc 
Renewable 
Fuel Gap 
Total 
RFS 
2008 0 0 0 0 9 9 
2009 0.6 0 0.5 0.1 10.5 11.10 
2010 0.95 0 0.65 0.2 12 12.95 
2011 1.35 0.25 0.8 0.3 12.6 13.95 
2012 2 0.5 1 0.5 13.2 15.2 
2013 2.75 1 1.28b 0.75 13.8 16.55 
2014 3.75 1.75 1.28 1 14.4 18.15 
2015 5.50 3 1.28 1.5 15 20.5 
2016 7.25 4.25 1.28 2 15 22.25 
2017 9 5.5 1.28 2.5 15 24 
2018 11 7 1.28 3 15 26 
2019 13 8.5 1.28 3.5 15 28 
2020 15 10.5 1.28 3.5 15 30 
2021 18 13.5 1.28 3.5 15 33 
2022 21 16 1.28 4 15 36 
All volumes are in billion gallons 
a Cellulosic biofuels have essentially been adjusted to zero each year up to 2014. 
b BBD was adjusted to 1.28BG for the 2013 year. 
c Calculated as difference between advanced biofuel and the sum of BBD and cellulosic biofuels. 
Source: EISA 2007 
 
 A final way to look at how biofuels meet their respective mandates is shown in Table 2.3 
which demonstrates for 2013 the mandated volumes that must be met and the actual RIN 
generated volumes that can be used to comply with the RFS. The mandated column assumes that 
all explicit mandates are met and not exceeded. If there is cellulosic biofuel or BBD overage, it 
will count towards the advanced biofuel gap and compete predominantly with sugarcane ethanol. 
As stated earlier, BBD will automatically have overage because the BBD mandate has to be met 
in actual gallons while it is given a 1.5 equivalence factor. For example, if the BBD mandate is 1 
BG, at least 0.5 BG15 will automatically count as overage for the advanced biofuels mandate as 
shown. Provided there is no advanced spillover, corn ethanol will fill the entire renewable fuel 
                                                 
15 Due to the range of 1.5-1.7 equivalence different BBD products carry. 
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gap of 13.8 BG. The mandated volumes are of course only theoretical. To the actual volume 
generated column we now must turn. 
Table 2.3. Mandates versus Outcomes for 2013 
 Mandated (EISA 2007) Actual 
Cellulosic Biofuels Mandate 1 0.014 
   
Biomass-based Diesel Mandatea 1 1.28 
   
Advanced Biofuel Mandateb 2.75 2.75 
Cellulosic biofuel 1 0.014 
Biomass-based diesel (1.5-1.7) 1.5 2.68 
Other advanced biofuelc 0.25 0.777 
Total Advanced Overage 0 0.707 
   
Renewable Fuel Gapd 13.8 13.8 
Advanced Overage 0 0.707 
Corn Ethanole 13.8 13.08 
   
Total RFS Mandatef 16.55 16.537 
Ethanol  13.55 
Biodiesel   3.06 
a
 The mandated amount of biomass-based diesel is in actual or ‘wet’ gallons. Biomass-based diesel counts 1.5 to 1.7 
times actual gallons towards the remainder of the mandates. 
b Advanced biofuels is renewable fuel (other than ethanol derived from corn starch) that is derived from renewable 
biomass, and achieves a minimum 50 percent reduction of GHG emissions relative to gasoline or diesel it is 
assumed to replace. . 
c This includes imported sugarcane ethanol, bio-butanol, renewable diesel, and other advanced biofuels. For 2013, 
Brazilian sugarcane ethanol was 0.457 billion gallons and most of the remainder (0.32 billion gallons) is imported 
renewable diesel. 
d The renewable fuel gap is the difference between the total RFS and the advanced biofuel mandate. 
e There is no corn ethanol mandate. Corn ethanol can only fill the residual of the renewable fuel gap which in theory 
can be filled by any advanced biofuel. However, up to 2013, corn ethanol has been the only biofuel counted towards 
the renewable fuel gap except for minute amounts of biodiesel, for example. 
f Renewable fuel is any biofuel blended that achieves a minimum GHG reduction of 20 percent. 
Source: EISA 2007; EPA (2014) 
 
 The actual volume shows how a stark contrast to the original EISA 2007 legislation. 
Cellulosic biofuels were expected to produce one billion gallons in 2013, but the actual mandate 
was revised downwards to just 14 million gallons. The major effect this has is increasing the 
burden on BBD and sugarcane ethanol to meet the advanced residual as the EPA did not lower 
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the overall advanced mandate down by the corresponding 986 million gallons. What happened 
was large increases in BBD production and imports as well as steady imports of sugarcane 
ethanol causing over 700 million gallons to spill over into the renewable fuel gap for the first 
time and displace corn ethanol which was instead exported. 
The importance of the equivalence values will be discussed in greater detail in a later 
section that will introduce Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) which keep track of each 
gallon of biofuel blended in the United States. Additionally, although we have looked at the 
original structure of the RFS, each year the EPA has the ability to adjust the mandates volumes.16 
While we have tried to explain the U.S. mandate structure in as simple form as possible until 
now, we must now introduce these other complexities.  
How the Renewable Fuel Standard is actually implemented 
The question naturally becomes how does the federal government (the EPA in this case) 
implement a mandate that specifies particular quantities of renewable fuel to be consumed each 
year? Is it implemented as a consumption mandate (as most economists model the U.S. 
mandate)17 rather than as a blend mandate, as in all other countries? If so, how do individual fuel 
blenders coordinate amongst themselves through the year to achieve a fixed quantity target each 
year? What incentive does each company have to ensure the mandate is met and how does the 
EPA ensure compliance? 
The answer is the EPA implements the U.S. consumption mandate as a blend mandate by 
specifying percentage standards for BBD, cellulosic, advanced biofuels and total renewable fuel. 
While most economists have modelled the RFS as a fixed quantity for each of ethanol and 
                                                 
16 For more information on their ability to adjust mandates, refer to Appendix 1. 
17 See for example Lapan and Moschini (2012), Cui et al. (2011), Babcock (2102), Abbott (2012), Tyner 
and Viteri (2011) and Hertel and Beckman (2012), just to name a few examples. 
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biodiesel this is not the case as we will show. Compliance is ensured through the system of 
renewable identification numbers (RINs). So the purpose of this section of the chapter is to 
explain the exact process of implementing the RFS: the establishment of percentage standards 
(blend mandate) and how the compliance mechanism of RINs work. 
Annual EPA volumes are given in Table 2.4 and are also called Renewable Volume 
Obligations (RVOs). The EPA has adjusted the cellulosic mandate down each year as supplies 
were not forthcoming but they did not change the total renewable fuel standard or advanced 
mandate. This implicitly increased the advanced mandate by 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, and 1 BG in 2010, 
2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively. Hence, through 2013, although cellulosic mandates declined 
relative to that specified by the EISA, the volumes for the advanced mandate were maintained as 
in the EISA 2007 and so was informally filled by greater volumes of BBD and Brazilian 
sugarcane ethanol. In 2013, the BBD mandate in 2013 was formally increased from 1 BG to 1.28 
BG.  However, in 2014, the EPA recommended (for the first time ever) a reduction in the total 
renewable mandate rather than having advanced biofuels (mostly BBD and Brazilian sugarcane 
ethanol) pick up the slack (EPA, 2013a). The 2014 mandated volumes are still being debated and 
may revert to the total renewable volumes as set out in the 2007 EISA. 
Table 2.4 Volume Used to Determine Percentage Standards (BG) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014a 
Cellulosic - - 0.0065 0.0065 0.01 0.014 0.017 
Biomass-based Dieselb - 0.5 0.65c 0.8 1 1.28 1.28 
Advanced Biofuel - 0.6 0.95 1.35 2 2.75 2.2 
Total Renewable Fuel 9 11.1 12.95 13.95 15.2 16.55 15.21 
a Ranges were provided for 2014 by the EPA, these are the average volumes to calculate percentage standards. 
b Biomass-based diesel volumes are in actual ‘wet’ gallons. 
c The EPA combined BBD compliance volumes for 2009 and 2010 to give blenders time to build capacity. 
Source: adapted from various EPA Regulatory Announcements 
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The EPA then alters the projected volumes depending on whether territories (e.g., Hawaii 
and Alaska) opt in or not for each year. In addition, they also can reduce the projected motor 
gasoline and motor diesel that is produced by exempt small refineries and refiners (EPA, 2013). 
There is a profound lack of consistency in the yearly regulatory announcements provided by the 
EPA and the necessary forecast data provided in Federal Register Notices. Each year’s 
percentage standards needs be calculated separately with the specific adjustments for that year. A 
complete listing of the equations and information the EPA requires to create the blend standards 
is provided in Appendix 2 and the forecast data is provided in Appendix 3.  
After determining the annual volumes of each mandate, the EPA publishes percentage 
standards for each mandate (the ratio of each mandated volume to total forecast gasoline and 
diesel consumption (excluding renewable gasoline18 and renewable diesel19) from the Energy 
Information Agency (EIA) in November prior to each calendar year. The result of the 
complicated yearly calculations is the only other accessible data the EPA furnishes and is given 
in Table 2.5: the percentage standards for cellulosic, BBD, advanced biofuels and total 
renewable fuel. Hence, the numerator is the renewable fuel volume as given in Table 2.4 and the 
denominator is the same in each case: total forecast gasoline and diesel consumption (excluding 
any renewable fuel and adjustments as discussed earlier). Additionally, the numerator for BBDs 
percentage standard is multiplied by 1.5 to account for its mandate being provided in ethanol 
equivalence values. Now that these percentages are calculated, each individual has to calculate 
for themselves how much of each biofuel mandate is to be blended with gasoline versus diesel. 
To this we now turn.  
                                                 
18 Any renewable fuel that is projected to be blended into gasoline. It is made up predominantly of corn 
and sugarcane ethanol (>99.99%), with trace amounts of biobutanol and cellulosic biogasoline. 
19 Any renewable fuel (i.e., biomass-based diesel, non-ester renewable diesel) projected to be blended into 
diesel 
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Table 2.5 EPA Mandated Percentage Standards 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Cellulosic - - 0.004% 0.003% 0.006% 0.008% 0.01% 
Biomass-based Diesel - - 1.1%a 0.69% 0.91% 1.12% 1.16% 
Advanced Biofuel - - 0.61% 0.78% 1.21% 1.60% 1.33% 
Total Renewable Fuel 7.76% 10.21% 8.25% 8.01% 9.23% 9.63% 9.20% 
a While there was a proposed volume for BBD in 2009, they had not yet developed the percentage standards for any 
category other than total renewable fuel. Blenders were allowed to combine 2009 and 2010 to build capacity and 
were allowed to double count 2009’s BBD compliance volume towards the overall 1.1 percent total renewable fuel 
standard. 
Source: adopted from various EPA Regulatory Announcements 
 
It is important to determine blend mandate ratios for BBD and ethanol as a ratio of total 
motor diesel consumption (diesel and BBD) and total motor gasoline consumption (gasoline and 
ethanol). This measure is the appropriate way to model the economics of blend mandates (de 
Gorter and Just, 2009) and is the exact definition of when the blend wall becomes an issue, in 
other words, regular cars are limited to 10 percent ethanol blend as defined by the second 
measure specified. The blend requirement published by the EPA is not useful directly: one 
requires the breakdown between biofuels blended with diesel versus gasoline, and we cannot 
model the economics of mandates or analyze the blend wall without having these modified blend 
ratios with total specific fuels in each of the denominators. Therefore we completely ignore the 
EPAs E/G distinction and calculate our own.  
After completing all of these complex steps as described until now, we can now come up 
with mandated versus actual blend ratios for each year in the United States. These are shown in 
Figure 2.4 and is for the first time calculated. The mandated blend ratio assumes that BBD meets 
its own mandate while the renewable fuel gap is filled with corn ethanol and the advanced 
residual is filled with sugarcane ethanol as blenders have traditionally done. This results in a 
significantly higher blend ratio relative to the blender choice ratio during 2013 although they are 
close in previous years. One reason for the high mandated blend ratio is during close 
19 
examination of the EPA’s forecast data we realize the forecasted total renewable fuel volume is 
16.55 BG and the EIA forecasts total renewable fuels to be blended with gasoline and diesel of 
15.16 BG, for a gap of nearly 1.4 BG. The gap is closed with small amounts of biofuels like 
naphtha and biogas that are not blended into conventional motor fuels.20 The gap is important for 
blenders because if they operate as the past with no changes, we expect the gap to be filled with 
corn ethanol and the blend ratio to equal the mandated blend ratio (i.e., simple assumptions here, 
no stored RINs being used, etc). 
The actual ethanol blend ratio has been relatively constant since 2010 around 9.5% of 
ethanol in total motor gasoline. This graph will become even more important as we move into 
modeling the blend wall in chapter 3 and will be further discussed there. For now, understanding 
how to calculate the mandated blend wall is sufficient.  
Despite the fact that biodiesel does not have an impending blend wall, it is still necessary 
to have the proper blend ratio to model the economics of a blend mandate. Hence, the 
comparisons of the two blend ratios for biodiesel as shown in Figure 2.5. Determining the 
biodiesel blend ratios does not take into account the 1.5 equivalence factor. The equivalence 
factor adjustment compares the energy content of biodiesel relative to ethanol, therefore using 
actual gallons makes more sense in calculating the ratio of biodiesel in diesel. Biodiesel has not 
reached 2.5 percent of motor diesel consumption in the United States as of 2013.
                                                 
20 Total of less than 30 million gallons ethanol equivalence 
20  
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
9.00%
10.00%
11.00%
12.00%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
B
le
n
d
 R
at
io
Figure 2.4. Ethanol Blend Ratios
Actual Blend Ratio Mandated Blend Ratio
Source: calculated using EIA (2014) data
21 
 
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
2010 2011 2012 2013
B
le
n
d
 R
at
io
Figure 2.5. Biodiesel Blend Ratio
Actual Blend Ratio Mandated Blend Ratio
Source: Calculated using EIA (2014) data
22 
Whether the actual quantity of each biofuel is above or below mandated volumes for the 
year is not important. What is important is that the blender fulfills their blend ratio complying 
with the percentage standard ethanol over pure gasoline and biodiesel over pure diesel. If actual 
gasoline consumption is half the forecast, it is possible that total ethanol used is half (can be 
higher if mandate is not binding or blenders want to store RINs for the following year, only 
possible by going over the mandated volume – see discussion in next section). This is an 
important distinction that shows the mandate is manifested as a blend mandate, not a 
consumption mandate. Chapter 3 will further explain blend ratio calculation issues and determine 
ratios using actual ethanol and motor gasoline consumption.  
Deciphering Renewable Identification Numbers 
Obligated parties to the RFS comply in the least cost manner available by blending 
biofuels and using renewable identification numbers (RINs) that ensure they fulfil the mandated 
blend requirement of the RFS. Every gallon of biofuel in the United States has at least one 
unique RIN that is assigned to it and is separated at the end of the supply chain when it is 
blended with gasoline or diesel (McPhail, Westcot, Lutman, 2011). The RINs are then submitted 
to the EPA as proof of compliance with the RFS. If a blender exceeds its mandate, it has the 
ability to keep the excess RINs for compliance in the next year or sold to other blenders.  
Due to the RFS being calculated in ethanol equivalent gallons, RIN prices are in dollar-
per-gallon-of-ethanol equivalent.21 Each RIN type has a D Code as shown in the final column of 
Table 2.1 based on fuel type and GHG reduction amount. Cellulosic biofuels generate D3 
(biogasoline) or D7 (biodiesel) RINs based on fuel type which both qualify for the cellulosic 
biofuels mandate although due to relatively small amounts being consumed the remaining 
                                                 
21 Even BBD RINs are on the market in ethanol equivalence. 
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discussion in this thesis will not delve into such details.22 The BBD mandate requires D4 RINs 
for compliance and can be filled with both biomass-based diesel and qualifying non-ester 
renewable diesel and requires GHG reduction of 50 percent. Other advanced biofuels outside of 
BBD such as sugarcane ethanol, naphtha, and biogas generate D5 RINs.23 Corn ethanol only 
qualifies under the D6 category where GHG emission reductions are required to be a minimum 
of 20 percent for new plants being built (Schnepf & Yacobucci, 2013).  
RIN demand comes from parties bound to the RFS who find it less expensive to buy 
separated RINs than to obtain them by purchasing and blending biofuel. RIN supply can come 
from obligated parties who blend more biofuels than required, and thus have more RINs than 
needed for compliance, or from non-obligated parties. Blenders value RINs as the price required 
to not have to blend that gallon of biofuel or to blend excess amounts. According to that 
principal, as RIN prices increase it reflects the incremental cost of not blending that biofuel or 
anticipating future compliance regulations.  
Biofuel producers are allowed flexibility under RFS to build up a surplus of RINs by 
producing or purchasing more than their specific obligation and are allowed to carry a maximum 
                                                 
22 An important point in the cellulosic category is that in any year that EPA waives any part of the 
cellulosic RFS, blenders have an option to buy their way out of blending instead of actually blending 
(U.S. Congress, 2007; and Tyner, 2010). To buy out of blending, obligated parties must purchase a credit 
from the EPA plus purchase an advance biofuels RIN. The price for the credit in 2013 is $0.42/gal., and 
the November 20, 2013, price of an advanced biofuel Renewable Fuel Identification Numbers (RIN) was 
$0.21/gal. Thus, the total cost of buying out of the RFS obligation would be $0.63/gal. Converting that to 
gasoline equivalent, assuming it would be valued on an energy basis, would make it $0.95/gal. As of 
November 20, 2013, wholesale gasoline was $2.66/gal., so the maximum one would pay for cellulosic 
biofuel is $3.61/gal gasoline equivalent. At present, there is no cellulosic biofuel available for that price. 
The consequence of this “off ramp” is that the cellulosic part of the RFS may not really be a binding 
mandate. Through the waiving of the cellulosic mandate, it is essentially creating additional mandates on 
BBD and advanced (sugarcane ethanol). 
23 The EPA has grandfather clauses allowing plants who utilize different production methods and feed 
stocks to qualify for specific mandates. There are volumes of non-ester renewable diesel that qualify for 
D4, D5, or D6 RINs depending usually on feed stocks going into production. 
24 
of 20% forward to the next year to help meet future compliance (Yacobucci, 2013). Blenders can 
also carry a deficit into a following year provided they make up the deficit by purchasing RINs 
or producing more biofuel to equalize their debts. Carrying over RINs is an important ability to 
meet future requirements depending on blender forecasts for profitability and blend ratios. 
Banked RINs can impact RIN prices if there are surpluses or shortages of RINs due to blender’s 
expectations. Corn ethanol has traditionally generated the largest amount of carry over RINs due 
to other biofuels capacity catching up the mandates. 
The conventional literature regarding RINs and the mandate structure focus on the 
individuality of each mandate and the relative lack of interactions between them (Thompson, 
Meyer, & Westhoff, 2009).24 A constant feature is RIN prices are determined within each 
mandate and fuel market and it greatly simplifies how to understand it. While this literature has 
been often been accurate and explains prices at certain times, in a new era of interacting RINs 
this literature must be further explored and deciphered.25 
The D6 RIN (the majority of volume comes from corn ethanol) price is the opportunity 
cost to blenders to make up the difference between the market price of gasoline, PG, and the 
consumer demanded price of ethanol, PE plus the ethanol tax credit when in effect, 𝑡𝑐. The D6 
RIN price only has value in theory if PE is greater than PG (Babcock, 2012). Using ethanol as an 
example, Equation 2.1 calculates what the D6 RIN price, 𝑃𝐷6 should theoretically be according 
to its blending margin. 
𝑃𝐷6 = 𝑃𝐺 − 𝑃𝐸 + 𝑡𝑐     (2.1) 
                                                 
24 (Irwin and Good, 2009) recognize the blend ratio for gasoline in 2013 exceeds the blend wall and 
implicitly forces blenders to use BBD to help reach their obligations. In addition, equalizing RIN prices 
show the tightly binding blend wall issues.  
25 D4 and D6 RIN prices are currently equal to each other. 
25 
Additionally, theory states that this RIN price applies to each gallon of biofuel produced, 
regardless if it is the first or the last produced during a calendar year and is paid to blenders who 
are willing to exceed their mandates and sell those excess RINs (Thompson, Meyer, & Westhoff, 
2009).  
Market data provides evidence of Equation 2.1 being accurate in the years leading up to 
2013 and is reported in Figure 2.6. An initial glance at the figure reveals an inverse relationship 
between the D6 RIN price and ethanol gasoline price spread which makes sense according to 
economic theory. Ethanol can potentially become market competitive when gasoline is priced 
higher and results in D6 RINs having no value.26 When the price of ethanol is priced higher than 
gasoline, blenders value D6 RINs to help recoup losses from exceeding their mandates as seen 
during early 2009. While loses to blenders reached nearly $0.20 per gallon, RIN values increased 
to $0.15 showing the theory works well. At the end of 2012 D6 RIN prices are less than 6 cents 
as blenders still value RINs for their intrinsic value, mainly they have value in the options future 
sense and are tradable. In addition, blenders in remote areas of the U.S. without easy access to 
ethanol supply will pay other blenders to exceed their obligations creating RIN demand.  
                                                 
26 Introduces a new issue, a gallon of ethanol only contains ~70% of energy relative to gasoline so the 
price of ethanol must reflect energy differential. 
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Figure 2.6. Pre 2013 D6 RIN Prices versus Equation 2.1 
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Source: OPIS (2014)
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While this ethanol formula and theory holds relatively true for a long period, a 
fundamental shift occurs in 2013 in the whole fuel market. Figure 2.7 shows the drastic shift in 
2013 as D6 prices start to climb rapidly even though the underlying fundamental market theory, 
the price of gasoline minus ethanol, has not changed. Figure 2.8 provides evidence of a new era 
for D6 RIN prices as the blending margin never becomes negative for ethanol blenders even 
though prices climb to nearly $1.20 per RIN. Clearly, there are some sort of new interactions 
within the RFS structure and fuel markets that has not been experienced until 2013. So far we 
have just considered D6 RINs and now introduce RINs that impact the RFS with a multiplication 
factor and can count over several mandates.  
 The equation for determining biodiesel D4 RIN prices is similar to the ethanol equation 
introduced earlier, the D4 RIN price,𝑃𝐷4, is equal to the price of diesel, PD minus the price of 
biodiesel, PB with a tax credit tc added in. The tax credit in biodiesel has played an important part 
in inducing blenders to use it. The tax credit increases blenders demand to pay for biodiesel by 
the exact amount of the tax credit tc (Babcock, 2011). 
𝑃𝐷4 = −1 ∗ (
𝑃𝐷−𝑃𝐵+𝑡𝑐
1.5
)     (2.2) 
Because prices in the numerator of Equation 2.3 are per actual biodiesel gallons and 𝑃𝐷4 is given 
in per ethanol equivalent, the entire term must be divided by its 1.5 equivalent factor to calculate 
the true D4 RIN value on the market and multiplied by negative one to make comparisons easier 
(Babcock, Moreira, & Peng, 2013).27 
                                                 
27 This is assuming the majority of BBD comes from ester based biodiesel with equivalence value of 1.5. 
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Equation 2.2 is used for the formula in Figure 2.9 which does a good job of predicting the 
BBD RIN price, PD4, for the years in question. In 2010, blenders were without the tax credit and 
so 𝑡𝑐was equal to zero in the formula. The year 2011 had the tax credit in effect and was equal to 
1. Again in there was no tax credit in 2012 and blenders went the entire year without it. Evidence 
from the D4 formula shows that when tax credit is left in the formula for 2012 it predicts very 
accurately (Babcock, 2011). This means producers anticipated the re-enactment of the tax credit 
with reasonable certainty and for 2014 re-occurs. We assume that the tax credit will be reinstated 
and blenders anticipate that. The consistent gap of D4 RIN prices exceeding the model is 
explained as intrinsic value, the value of time in the futures market means they will consistently 
exceed what the model predicts due to the potential to have more value in the future (Irwin, 
2013). While ethanol D6 RINs have been sharply affected in 2013, D4 RINs continue to be 
determined by their respective blend margin. This issue is very important and will be explained 
in later chapters. 
When RIN prices are reported, they are provided in ethanol equivalent values because of 
how blenders must comply with their RFS obligations. Figure 2.10 provides data on the three 
main categories of RINs that are traded according to market prices: biodiesel (D4), advanced 
(D5), and ethanol (D6) (OPIS, 2014). According to economic theory, biodiesel (D4) RINs must 
be worth at least the value of D5 and D6 RINs because it can meet both non-cellulosic advanced 
and overall mandates. Traditionally D4 has traded at a large price premium over other RINs due 
to biodiesels large price discrepancy relative to diesel as blenders need incentives to blend excess 
amounts. Advanced D5 RINs have traded in the middle range of D4 and D6 and this makes 
economic sense as they can meet both advanced and the total renewable fuels mandate. The final 
category, D6 RINs, have traditionally been extremely low priced and typically used entirely by 
31 
corn ethanol as explained earlier. Figure 2.10 shows that substantial price spreads that existed in 
RIN markets until 2013 when the markets converge for the first time. The fact that they have 
converged and have been strongly correlated since the start of 2013 and into 2014 is very 
important and will be the focus of the remainder of the thesis. 
This chapter has summarized the very complicated and convoluted Renewable Fuel 
Standard that is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency. The lack of consistency 
in EPA information that is released causes a lot of improper economics to be done. This chapter 
serves to cut through the dense shroud and provide an easy to understand explanation of how the 
nested structure allows for multiple compliance pathways for blenders. In addition, the nested 
structure allows biofuel spillovers into other mandates and therefore RINs equalizing is not 
shocking but what it tells the market is extremely important. Another important distinction is 
showing the proper way to model the RFS as a blend mandate and not a consumption mandate as 
many other economists view it. Finally we explain RINs and how historically they have been 
priced significantly differently although 2013 a market shifting dynamic occurred. 
During the year 2013 many firsts occurred in the biofuels markets. This paper will now 
determine what is happening with RIN prices and how ethanol and biodiesel markets begin to 
interact. As RIN prices have equalized it has led to many unforeseen effects of biofuel usage and 
impending costs to American fuel consumers. The mandate interaction takes place because of the 
E10 blend wall which will be explained in the next chapter to which we now turn.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ECONOMICS OF THE BLEND WALL 
A Simple Model of the Blend Wall 
The ‘blend wall’ refers to potential engine damage that can occur in vehicles when using 
gasoline blends with greater than 10 percent ethanol.28 Prior to 2013, the required blend for 
ethanol was very close too or less than 10 percent, but in 2013 the mandated blend ratio was at 
11.07 percent, causing the blend wall to become an issue.29 Provided blenders did not want to 
breach the this 1.4 billion gallon shortfall between the total renewable fuel volume and 
forecasted ethanol and biodiesel consumption as described in Chapter 2 for 2013 with ethanol it 
would necessitate additional biofuel blending (non-ethanol) or using stored RINs (de Gorter, 
Drabik, & Just, 2013). Historically, corn ethanol has filled the majority of the renewable fuel gap 
and if this is what happened in 2013, the blend ratio of ethanol would have been approached the 
calculated mandate ratio. Ethanol production during 2013 was still strong but excess ethanol 
production that could not be consumed domestically was exported (not counted towards the 
RFS) (Meyer & Paulson, 2013). But we will show there are multiple ways the blend wall can be 
overcome. 
Some economists consider an average of 9 percent to be the effective blend ratio 
maximum across all areas and seasons (Tyner and Viteri, 2010; Tyner, 2009; Tyner, Dooley, 
Hurt, & Quear, 2008). According to this theory, the blend wall has been in effect since 2009 
although Figure 2.3 clearly illustrates actual ethanol blend ratios were 9.33%, 9.61%, 9.66%, and 
                                                 
28 The remainder of the paper will assume blend ratios use formula (E/E+G) as used by de Gorter and Just, 
2009. 
29 As calculated in Chapter 2 using EIA and EPA forecasts. 
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9.77% in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively. Comparing the actual blend ratios to the 
mandated illustrates the large gap between what blenders have traditionally done and 2013. So 
why didn’t D6 RIN prices skyrocket earlier then 2013 as shown in Chapter 2 if the blend wall 
was actually binding before? The nested mandate structure of the U.S. RFS allows blenders to 
use biofuels that are higher up the mandate structure (e.g., BBD or sugarcane ethanol) to push 
corn ethanol out of the renewable fuel gap. We show that blenders utilized increased amounts of 
biodiesel to help breach the blend wall. But first, we give a simple model of the blend wall to 
motivate the discussion. 
The simplest economic thought on RINs can be represented in a supply and demand 
graph in Figure 3.1 showing how conventional literature determines their respective prices.30 If 
the mandate is binding, there will be more biofuel produced for a higher cost than consumers 
will pay as shown in the left-hand panel (Babcock, 2012). The mandate enforces a certain 
amount of biofuel that must be produced over and above what a free market demands (P*, Q*). 
The price difference between the supply and demand curves at the mandated amount is known as 
the RIN price (Thompson, Meyer, & Westhoff, 2009) (Babcock, 2012). Consumers are price 
sensitive and unwilling to purchase biofuels for more than the market price of gasoline or 
diesel.31 The right-hand panel considers when a tax credit exists and shifts blender’s willingness 
to pay up by the amount of the tax credit.  
                                                 
30 While ethanol does not have an explicit mandate, it can be implied that one essentially exists as 
advanced biofuels cannot currently fill the entire renewable fuel gap. 
31 In addition, the difference in mileage between gasoline and diesel, and ethanol and biodiesel, 
respectively, must be taken into account. 
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Figure 3.1. Conventional Literature determining the RIN Price on a Binding Mandate 
 
 
 
 
Source: based on Thompson et al., 2009 
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Let us make it clear from the outset: RINs are not a maximum like a production quota or 
cap & trade permits. Rather, the ethanol mandate is a minimum blend ratio (RINs have value 
only for the ethanol blended beyond the required minimum). If a firm blends less than the 
minimum, it does not free up a RIN (unlike with a production quota or cap & trade permit 
system). For a production quota or cap & trade permits, their value is on the total quotas or 
permits. The economics are very different. A RIN is freed up only if you blend above the 
minimum required. That RIN can be sold to some firm who blends less than the minimum 
(otherwise, the RIN has no value). Of course, the RIN can be stored and sold later but same 
concept; it is just that the buyer of the RIN is going under the blend requirement in some other 
time period. If a firm buys a RIN to blend less than the minimum required, some other firm had 
to have blended more than the minimum to generate that RIN in the first place. 
A RIN is required for every gallon of ethanol blended with gasoline as proof to the EPA 
you are blending the minimum required (and these RINs are forfeited or “retired” to the EPA – 
they are not kept and sold on the free market). The RIN has an opportunity cost only if the firm 
blends more than the minimum required (when it does not have to be forfeited to the EPA and so 
the firm has a “free” RIN to be sold now, later or used later). So the RIN price reflects the cost of 
compliance: differential costs of each firm to meet the minimum blend requirement. The more 
homogenous the cost structures, the lower the price of RINs (and the fewer traded presumably, 
independent of speculators). 
To understand the basic economics of a blend wall, let us begin with a very simplified 
world where there is only corn ethanol and E85 is the only way to breach the blend wall. When 
the blend wall is reached (less than 10 percent but that is irrelevant in this simplified analysis), 
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the value of a D6 RIN has to increase to pay E85 producers and consumers to increase E85 
supply (infrastructure of E85 stations, increased cost of marketing, etc.) and demand (increase 
the number of flex cars, more fuel per flex car). 32 High D6 RIN prices reflect blender’s 
willingness to pay others to exceed their obligated volumes. In this way, the aggregate blend 
ratio is satisfied. According to theoretical determination of D6 RIN prices, the underlying 
fundamental is the price spread of gasoline and ethanol; although in 2013 the price of gasoline is 
at a significant premium to ethanol and D6 RIN values should only have intrinsic value 
(approximately 1-4 cents).33  
High D6 RIN prices mean consumers of fuel (E10) pay the cost (e.g., in form of higher 
priced E10 Fuel) to have ethanol produced above 10 percent consumed by flex fuel vehicles 
using E85. The D6 RIN prices mostly reflect the costs of having to sell ethanol outside the 
established E10 market. In order to induce more E85 sales (incl. more E85 stations and flex cars) 
consumers require a 75¢/gal discount just to get E85 mile equivalence to E10 (Babcock & 
Pouliot, 2013).34 The result for consumers using E85 is less miles travelled per gallon, filling up 
more often, and a relatively low amount of stations equipped for sale. Babcock also finds that to 
get flex fuel vehicles owners to choose E85 a further discount of 15 percent is required over the 
equalized cost per mile travelled (2013).  Most of these stations are located in the Midwest where 
the majority of ethanol is produced and unsurprisingly where the lowest E85 prices are.35  
                                                 
32 Approximately 3 percent of vehicle fleet in the U.S. are flex fuel (EIA, 2014). 
33 E85 ranges from 30-70 percent ethanol depending on seasonal variation in fuel specifications, we use a 
miles equivalence factor of 0.799 for pricing E85 relative to E10. It other words it means the price of E10 
must be discounted approximately 20% to reach an equivalent E85 price. 
34 According to EIA the current national average gasoline price is $3.547 per gallon, hence a discount of 
$0.717 is currently needed to reach energy equivalence of E85 relative to E10. Therefore, if E85 is priced 
at $2.83 per gallon, it is equal to E10 on a miles equivalent basis.  
35 Nationally only 2 percent of all retail stations offer E85 (EIA, 2014) 
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Figure 3.2. E85 RIN Market 
 
The blend wall is a special case as it represents a maximum for E10 cars but the required 
blend is greater than 10 percent. The RIN price now reflects the same underlying relative 
compliance cost between firms except this time it includes the differential costs of E10 versus 
E85; some have no capacity to sell E85 so differential costs between firms are now higher (plus 
part of RIN price to induce more E85 sales so existing E85 cars have to buy more (and higher 
ethanol to gasoline ratios), more E85 cars have to be sold and more E85 stations have to be built. 
Because E85 contains more ethanol than E10 it generates more RINs for the blender who is able 
to pass along price discounts and E85 becomes relatively cheaper to E10. Figure 3.2 exhibits the 
simple model of the blend wall using higher blends of ethanol to breach the blend wall. If there is 
no blend wall, PRIN will be equal to the distance between fuel demand and E10 supply to induce 
excess consumption over the free market. When the blend wall becomes a constraint for 
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blenders, a higher RIN price is needed to increase supply of E85. In this model, the D6 RIN price 
is a tax on E10 to help subsidize an increase in the supply and demand for E85, perhaps even 
providing a discount to consumers for E85 on a miles per gallon basis. Essentially, high D6 RIN 
prices are supposed to induce consumers to buy E85 at a discount in order to be adopted in 
greater volumes and help to breach the blend wall. 
As shown in the previous chapter, the price of D6 RINs start to immediately increase in 
January 2013 (see Figure 2.10). Blenders buy excess D6 RINs to avoid blending additional 
ethanol over their E10 blend limit. The discount of E85 relative to E10 is shown in Figure 3.3 
versus the price of D6 RINs for 2013. Because the blend wall is binding for 2013, the D6 RIN 
price should be positively correlated with the price discount of E85 relative to E10 because the 
higher the RIN price, the more blenders can discount E85 and increase consumption. They track 
very closely allowing E85 to be discounted until August when RIN prices fall substantially more 
than the E85 discount. When the RIN price falls, blenders are not able to tax E10 to subsidize 
E85 price discounts to maintain the 20 percent discount necessary for miles equivalence to occur. 
If the blend wall is still in effect why does the D6 RIN price fall so quickly and drastically? To 
this we now turn.  
 Collecting accurate up to data on the consumption of E85 in the United States is very 
tricky. Certain states with high consumption like Minnesota and Iowa keep track of statewide 
consumption reasonably well. Nationally, the EIA releases data but are currently waiting to 
release more accurate survey yearly results from 2012. Babcock and Pouliot calculated that 500 
million gallons of E85 capacity exists within the U.S (2013). Figure 3.4 shows an approximate 
EIA consumption data for E85 since 2007. Overall, the amount of ethanol being blended as E85 
is very small relative still to overall ethanol consumption, less than 1 percent. 
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If we continue to assume ethanol is capable of breaching the blend wall with only E85 
price discounts, than we would assume D6 RIN prices to stay high according to equation 2.1 in 
Chapter 2 because gasoline is still priced at a premium relative to ethanol. As discussed further 
in Chapter 2, D6 RINs cannot be valued at more than a D4 RIN or else a rational blender would 
switch to the lower cost option immediately. What this means is that biodiesel D4 RINs set the 
margin with respect to the ability to discount E85 with higher valued D6 RINs (Irwin. 2013). 
This is a very important distinction to make because it brings the roles of mandates and 
multiplicative factors even more strongly into the conversation. Essentially, D4 RINs continue 
along their blend margin and implicitly set the amount of discount that E85 consumers can 
receive. While acknowledged by Good and Irwin, there needs to be more research and analysis 
on the impact that biodiesel now holds over ethanol with a binding blend wall and what this 
means into the future if the ethanol mandate is expanded (2013). While most economists agree 
the RIN market is influenced by prices of its inputs (i.e., gasoline and ethanol), the RIN market 
could start to influence what biofuels are blended and how they are used with respect to the RFS. 
It could potentially start to push up its RINs in order to pay for more E85, causing the price of 
biodiesel to increase as well but more research is needed. 
The formal analysis of Figure 3.2 assumes that D6 RINs are the only way to breach the 
blend wall by inducing consumers to use more ethanol by lowering the price of E85. There are 
several ways around the blend wall. Blenders have the option of using banked RINs or 
borrowing RINs from the future. There were 2.5 BG of RINs carried into 2013, which was more 
than enough to eliminate the excess ethanol that needs to be sold.(EPA, 2014) However, blenders 
may have felt 2014 to have even tighter blending constraints, so it was likely only RINs that 
expired in 2013 were used (stored RINs have a 24-month shelf life). Increased E15 and E85 sales 
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are possible as the EPA recently approved E15 for cars manufactured after 2001, but the market 
has not grown very much due to higher supply costs and customer resistance. Lowering the price 
of ethanol with higher value RINs could reduce or eliminate the amount of E0 sales. Another 
option is to increase the use of drop-in biobutanol which can go to E13 and each gallon counts 
1.3 towards mandate (de Gorter, Drabik, & Just, 2013).  
Up to now in this chapter we have just considered what is going on within the corn 
ethanol market and the renewable fuel gap. We understand higher D6 RIN price are needed to 
subsidize E85 and help breach the blend wall for consumption of ethanol. According to Tyner 
and Vitera, they argue that the blend wall became an issue in 2010 when the actual blend ratio 
exceeded 9% for the first time although the market did not react in any way to show this is the 
case. Data in Figure 2.4 would empirically show the blend wall is closer to 9.5 percent as it has 
been fairly consistent for the last 4 years. The blend wall was finally reached due to increasing 
mandates for 2013 which forced blenders to breach the blend wall and meet their RFS 
obligations though another compliance pathway.  
How the Nested Mandate Structure of the RFS helped Breach the Blend Wall 
Within the RFS nested structure, advanced biofuels have the opportunity to displace 
ethanol provided it is cost efficient (e.g., lowest compliance cost) for blenders. The advanced 
biofuel mandate is composed of BBD, cellulosic, and other advanced biofuels (mostly Brazilian 
sugarcane ethanol) as described earlier in Chapter 2. Sugarcane ethanol imports have been vital 
in filling the remainder of the advanced mandates obligations. During 2013, blenders began to 
use biodiesel (domestic production and imports) overage to meet the additional 1.4 BG above the 
ethanol blend wall which is EPA RIN generation, not actual consumption. RIN generation means 
some RINs can be kept for future year’s compliance if blenders exceed their mandates although 
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D6 RIN generation would be expected to be much higher if blenders are utilizing higher blends 
of ethanol instead of another pathway. Biodiesel generated approximately 750 million ethanol 
equivalent RINs above its mandate during 2013 and on its own nearly met the advanced 
mandate. When combined with sugarcane ethanol and other advanced biofuels it resulted in over 
700 million advanced RINs able to spill over into the renewable fuel gap to compete with corn 
ethanol. There has been spill over RIN generation previously although RIN prices did not 
equalize until 2013. This is further proof of mandate interactions and the blend wall not being 
realized until then. We can now separate out the two main competitors for the renewable fuel gap 
for 2013, first by discussing Brazilian sugarcane ethanol and lastly biomass-based diesel. 
Importing Brazilian sugarcane ethanol enables blenders another potential compliance 
pathway primarily for meeting their advanced biofuel RFS obligations. Sugarcane ethanol 
qualifies as D5 advanced RINs but is physically identical to corn ethanol when blended with 
gasoline. The EPA’s differentiation of the classification of these two identical products is due 
entirely to their classification of GHG reduction. The importance of this is realized when 
blenders try to breach the blend wall with sugarcane ethanol, which is blended at the exact same 
limitations as corn ethanol. The RFS mandate structure has induced intra-industry ethanol trade 
between the United States and Brazil on an unprecedented scale and therefore is a waste of 
resources as they are identical products (Meyers et al., 2013).36 Another important impact is the 
price difference of sugarcane relative to corn ethanol. If the price of ethanol in the U.S. rises 
substantially it will impact consumption of ethanol and use of biofuels. According to Meyer et al 
the net result of the ethanol intra-industry trade is higher Brazilian ethanol prices, higher 
                                                 
36 Bilateral trade of ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil started to develop in 2010 due to uncoordinated 
environmental policy between the two countries and has resulted in substantial quantities of ethanol 
crossing paths on the ocean (Meyers et al, 2013) 
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conventional ethanol prices in the U.S., and additional transportation costs. Intra industry ethanol 
trade between the U.S. and Brazil is increasing ethanol costs in both countries while increasing 
GHG from transportation.  
In Figure 3.5, world ethanol prices are shown for Omaha, Antwerp, and Sao Paulo in 
USD per gallon. While European prices have been priced at a premium relative to the other two, 
in late 2010 into early 2011 Brazil experienced a rapid run up in anhydrous prices due to 
production issues. The result was zero imports of ethanol from Brazil in 2010 and took until the 
end of 2011 for imports to begin again and therefore was unable to help fill the residual of the 
advanced mandate. As Figure 3.6 shows, nearly 60% of ethanol imports during 2011 still came 
from Brazil as blenders required a certain volume to help fill the residual of the advanced 
mandate during that year. Looking at RIN prices during this time both D5 and D6 spike as the 
cost of advanced biofuels became prohibitively expensive. This fact will become very important 
in helping to show why model prediction error occurs in Chapter 4 and referring back to Figure 
2.2 shows the lack of sugarcane ethanol required BBD to expand past its mandate for the first 
time in 2011. The price effect depends on elasticities of supply and demand in both countries as 
well as market prices of fossil fuels and inputs into biofuel production which are impacted by 
policies in both countries. 
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Importing Brazilian sugarcane does not make sense for economic reasons but it will 
continue to occur due to sugarcane ethanol being nested higher than corn ethanol in the RFS. In 
Figure 3.6 it shows since 2011 over 60 percent and since 2012 80 percent, of all ethanol imports 
have come from Brazil into the United States to count for the RFS and LCFS in California. Due 
to the ethanol consumption constraints in the U.S. resulting from the blend wall and over 450 
million RINs of sugarcane ethanol, this means less corn ethanol can be consumed and instead 
must be exported in 2013. The result of the RFS nested mandate structure means domestic corn 
ethanol producers must export excess ethanol while more expensive homogenous products are 
imported and consumed by American gasoline users instead. EISA 2007 states the amount of 
advanced biofuels is to continue increasing so sugarcane ethanol will be counted on to help fill it 
while actively contributing to problems such as the blend wall. Essentially, corn and sugarcane 
ethanol are interchangeable and with a binding blend wall, blenders can use either product up the 
blend limit of roughly 9.5 percent but then again must switch to another biofuel (biodiesel) or 
use stored RINs. 
But for 2013, BBD nearly fills the entire advanced mandate on its own as shown in 
Figure 2.3. This means BBD and sugarcane ethanol spill into the renewable fuel gap and displace 
corn ethanol due to the nested structure which is shown by the dotted black line expanding 
advanced biofuels. Because BBD has (for all purposes) met the advanced mandate, the side 
effect of importing sugarcane ethanol has is displacing corn ethanol from being consumed 
domestically in the United States. As shown in Figure 3.7 the United States has transitioned from 
a net exporter of ethanol in 2009 to a net importer ever since. This result is primarily due to the 
Renewable Fuel Standard and how the EPA has chosen to categorize certain types of ethanol. 
Until 2011 the U.S. consumed more ethanol than was mandated as we described earlier. Starting 
51 
in 2012, the total RFS continued to increase as well as not waiving the cellulosic mandate put 
pressure on BBD as the only viable commercial biofuel to start filling parts of the advanced 
residual that ethanol no longer could. In 2013, blenders had 1.4 billion gallons of biofuel that had 
to be non-ethanol and this finally manifested itself to the extreme that RIN prices and BBD 
production and imports took off. 
The blend mandate is a cumulative month by month obligation for blenders. As an easy 
to understand example of how BBD blending increased over 2013, Figure 3.5 shows biodiesel 
increasing nearly every month and exceeds its mandate for 2013 by over 750 million ethanol 
equivalent gallons. In the figure the difference between advanced (e.g., D4 and D5) and BBD 
RIN generation is composed mostly of sugarcane ethanol. Once BBD spills over into the 
renewable fuel gap, D6 and D4 RINs must equalize as fuel blenders have the option to start using 
biodiesel RINs or blend BBD to meet their obligations (Irwin and Good, 2013).   
What this really means is the RFS worked as intended (as incomprehensible as it is) by 
giving blenders the option of choosing BBD to meet their obligations and lower their compliance 
costs. Without this option, E10 fuel consumers (the majority of consumers) would have been 
responsible for a much larger tax (in form of a D6 RIN price) to pay for E85 stations, flex fuel 
vehicles, and extra consumption of the E85 fuel. It is not clear the pressure on biodiesel and D4 
RIN prices in order to for D6 to approach and stay strongly correlated. What is clear from all this 
that RIN markets did function to provide market clearing for blenders choosing to blend or not 
blend biofuels. The overall mandates have changed trade patterns within the U.S. and not due to 
market dynamics. The RFS is driving these changes and with continued increases planned until 
2022 it is possible that different trade patterns will emerge as different mandates become 
limiting. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MODEL OVER PREDICTION ERROR 
This chapter focuses on the model created by de Gorter, Just, and Drabik on predicting soy oil 
(de Gorter, Drabik, & Timilsina, 2013). The model has provided a close representation of the 
respective market prices with the exception of a few time periods. The RFS are directly 
responsible for market conditions during 2011 and 2013 that causes the model to over predict. 
Building on what has been discussed so far, we can explain the over prediction of biodiesel 
prices due to interacting mandates and the blend wall. Additionally, this paper will address those 
conditions that led to excess profits in biodiesel producers in those years.  
Soybean Oil Pricing Prediction Model 
 Following de Gorter et al., the price of soy oil is linked to the price of biodiesel because 
of the zero profit condition (2013) where biodiesel producers bid up the price of soybean oil until 
MC = MR in biodiesel production: 
𝑃𝑠𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑖𝑙 =
1
𝛾
∗ (𝑃𝐵 − 𝐶𝐵)     (4.1) 
where 𝑃𝑠𝑜𝑦 𝑜𝑖𝑙 is the predicted price of soybean oil ($/lb)), 𝛾 = 7.6 (gallons of soy oil produced 
per bushel of soybeans), 𝑃𝐵 is the price of biodiesel ($/gal), and 𝐶𝐵 is the fixed cost of processing 
as derived by de Gorter et al. 
The predictor of the price of soybean oil given by equation 4.1 is exceptional except for 
two periods during 2011 and 2013 as shown in Figure 4.1. Prediction error is very tight and is 
usually less than 5 cents and even during 2011 does not reach 20 cents. Still, it is important to 
look at why the model does not closely predict all the time and we must use all the information 
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described so far to accomplish that. The main error component in the model comes from the 
price of biodiesel being raised relative to its input costs. We assume blenders should have bid up 
the cost of processing in order for no profits to occur over the long run.  
To solve for 2011, we must return to Figure 3.5 that shows the price of sugarcane ethanol 
rising rapidly during late 2010 and into early 2011 as Brazil experienced production issues. 
Blenders still had responsibilities to fill the advanced residual of the RFS and started to produce 
biodiesel above its mandate for the first time. Because the demand for biodiesel increased it put 
pressure biodiesel prices which also increased significantly. The zero profit condition underlying 
equation (1) requires the price of soybean oil to be bid up with𝑃𝐵. Blender demand for biodiesel 
increased the price and allowed refiners to make excess profits during 2011 as they could not bid 
up the price of soybean oil high fast enough and did not have the production capacity to do so as 
shown in Figure 4.2. Biodiesel plants continued to make excess profits as the price of sugarcane 
ethanol stabilized and dropped during the latter part of 2011, imports started from Brazil again 
and this lowered demand for biodiesel to exceed its own mandate, lowering the price and ending 
excess profits by early 2012. This proof shows that short term demand can increase the purchase 
price of biodiesel at an increased rate relative to input costs although long term profits do return 
to zero. During 2011 the interaction within the advanced mandate was the first clue that the RFS 
was functioning as designed and providing biofuel blenders the ability to choose which products 
to use to meet their obligations.  
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Moving forward to the year 2013, Figures 4.1 and 4.2 seem to show an exact relationship 
relative to 2011. The soybean oil model again over predicts the actual price of soybean oil in 
addition to excess biodiesel plant profits that increase rapidly. While similar market price 
outcomes occur for the two years, there are drastic mandate interactions occurring within the 
RFS. During 2011 the interaction took place within the advanced biofuel mandate between 
biodiesel and Brazilian sugarcane ethanol. The drastic price increase of sugarcane ethanol 
resulted in much higher demand for biodiesel to exceed its mandate. During 2013, it is not a 
price increase, but the physical limitation of the ethanol blend wall. As discussed earlier, the 
blend wall limits ethanol to be blended off to a maximum of 10 percent into gasoline. Therefore, 
the biodiesel mandate is again being exceeded to help blender’s lower compliance costs although 
it is now being pushed all the way into the renewable fuel gap.  
The increased demand for biodiesel due to the blend wall again pushes its price higher 
starting in January, 2013. The zero profit condition expects the price of inputs to be bid up 
although in the short term producers cannot bid up the price quickly enough. The result of the 
blend wall is excess profits occurring in the short term for biodiesel producers. Throughout 2013 
biodiesel producers earned excess profits although they decreased as the year progress after 
peaking heading towards 2014. An important note must be made about the excess biodiesel 
production. Figure 4.3 shows the United States biodiesel world trade relationship since 2010. 
One outcome of requiring more biodiesel to help breach the blend wall was the increased 
imports. Overall, over 500 million gallons of biodiesel was imported to be blended.37 The 
increased price of biodiesel clearly had an impact on world trade as blenders preferred to import 
                                                 
37 Biomass based biodiesel accounted for over 300 million gallons, while renewable diesel accounted for over 200 
million gallons of the imports. Exports still occurred during the time period, any export RINs are not counted. 
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as opposed to produce even more domestically. This also helped keep the price of soybean oil 
lower than the predicted as domestic producers of BBD did not have to increase their own 
production to bid up input prices.  
Similar to 2011, excess profits of biodiesel producers decreased towards the end of 2013 
and became normal. According to the 2007 EISA, the advanced, cellulosic, and total RFS were 
expected to increase for 2014 which would mean the blend wall would continue to be a 
significant issue and one would expect BBD profits to continue. Instead, the EPA released its 
2014 RFS and decreased the overall mandate for the first time, reducing the demand for excess 
biodiesel production over and above its mandate (EPA, 2013a). As of halfway through 2014, 
everyone is still awaiting the final ruling of the RFS for 2014 which will help blenders make 
decisions on which biofuels are required to comply while still having the blend wall imposed on 
it as describer further in appendix 1. Clearly, as more biofuel continues to be required, mandate 
interactions and how blenders choose to comply with their obligations will become an even more 
important market driver. 
The zero profit condition holds true for the long term in calculating the price of soybean 
oil. In the short term, the RFS allows mandate interactions that can increase demand instantly for 
biofuels that cause excess profits. In this case, biodiesel has interacted with sugarcane ethanol 
during 2011 and corn ethanol during 2013 to cause model prediction error that have been 
explained in this chapter. Future interactions will continue to occur and depending on EPA RFS 
changes it may lead to more short term profits although over the long term we expect to see 
profits to return to normal.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis analyzed biofuel production, consumption, pricing, and trade due to mandate 
interactions between that occur due to the United States Renewable Fuel Standard. The EPA has 
created and segregated biofuels according to type of fossil fuel replacer and expected greenhouse 
gas reduction. The nested structure of the RFS allows different biofuels to flow down after filling 
its own respective mandate and then competing for the next mandate. In addition to these 
differences, biofuels also count towards mandates according to their energy content. The result is 
biodiesel can count up to 1.7 times towards the total renewable mandate while ethanol, 
regardless of its source and mandate category, can only count once.  
We only considered biofuels that were blended into transportation fuels such as gasoline 
and diesel, as well as with limited cellulosic biofuel production only considered it from its 
mandate impact on other advanced biofuels. Up to 2011, biofuels only filled their own respective 
mandates and spillover did not occur. During 2011, BBD was forced to exceed its mandate 
resulting from high sugarcane ethanol prices and created competition for the first time for the 
remainder of the advanced biofuel mandate. This forced increased BBD production and drove 
the price of biodiesel very high relative to the input costs. Producers of BBD were not able to bid 
up input prices quickly enough to prevent excess profits which occurred throughout the year. As 
the year progressed, sugarcane ethanol imports resumed and reduced BBD demand decreased 
prices and zero profits resumed. Understanding this market interaction shows how short term 
profits can arise for producers due to biofuels interacting across nested mandates although long 
term profits return to normal. 
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 The EPA publishes volumes yearly that are used to determine percentage 
standards that blenders must comply with. Many economists get fooled into thinking the volumes 
are what is important for biofuel consumption in the U.S., and view the RFS as a consumption 
mandate. We showed that while the volume is used in calculating the actual blend ratios, the RFS 
is a blend mandate and blenders must comply with a percentage of fuel. This distinction is vital, 
if fuel consumption is half of forecast and the blend ratio is 10%, blenders only are required to 
use 10% of half the forecast as opposed to a static total volume. The percentage standards given 
in the form by the EPA are still not convenient for calculating how much ethanol and biodiesel 
needs to be blended into gasoline and diesel, respectively. In Chapter 2, we show how to convert 
the percentages provided by the EPA into ethanol and biodiesel blend ratios and are shown in 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5, respectively.  
An extremely important realization in Figure 2.4 shows that the United States has been at 
the perceived blend wall since 2010 of 9 percent. Clearly this is not the blend wall or RFS 
mandate interactions would have occurred significantly before. The blend wall value is around 
9.5 percent and blenders have been watering down the scotch since 2010. Why does 2013 
become the key year for converging RIN markets and mandate interactions? The issue is 
increasing mandates, while blenders were able to blend more ethanol then required previously 
and water down the scotch, in 2013 the increasing advanced biofuel mandate (and waiving of 
cellulosic imposing additional blending on BBD and sugarcane ethanol) forced blenders to reach 
maximum ethanol blending and not breach it with either sugarcane or corn ethanol, but biodiesel.  
The result of the blend wall show up in different ways. It forced D6 RINs, traditionally 
trading for a few cents, over $1/gallon as blenders attempted to induce more E85 consumption by 
subsidizing it with increased RIN value. If ethanol was the only biofuel that existed within the 
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RFS, RINs would simply increase to a value where blenders and consumers would be 
compensated to adopt higher volumes of ethanol (including flex fuel vehicles and stations). Due 
to the nested structure of the RFS, D6 RINs cannot be valued more than D4 RINS. Through 
2013, biodiesel RINs continue to be determined according to its blending margin which 
correlates to the cost of producing more biodiesel than mandated. The result is D6 RINs only 
reached a value equal to D4 RINs and were not able to induce additional ethanol consumption 
within the U.S. by a significant volume. Biodiesel demand increased by blenders who valued it 
as much and more as ethanol in order to meet their RFS obligations. 
The increased biodiesel demand led to a huge increase in imports of biodiesel and 
renewable diesel by the U.S., as well as larger domestic production. The additional demand 
forced higher biodiesel prices and excess profits by producers of BBD who were not able to bid 
up input prices fast enough until the end of 2013. Similar to 2011, due to a mandate interaction, 
this time within the renewable fuel gap, led to excess biodiesel plant profit throughout the year. 
The RFS has the potential to create biofuel interactions yearly due to the nested structure and 
valuing biofuels differently. It will be interesting to see the 2014 final percentage standards that 
are released by the EPA as different groups attempt to persuade them based on their expected 
gains (i.e., biofuel plants) and reducing losses (i.e., oil companies). 
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APPENDIX 1 
EPA adjustments to formal mandates 
The EPA has the authority ability to adjust the total renewable mandate as well as 
cellulosic, biomass based biodiesel, and the advanced mandates. The EPA until 2014, had not 
altered a mandated volume except for cellulosic of which it has had to do yearly. The cellulosic 
mandate has been waived each year since the RFS inception. While the cellulosic mandate has 
been waived, the EPA has not reduced the total amount of advanced fuels to be blended. In 2012, 
the EPA forecast 500 million gallons of cellulosic fuels produced, while only 8.65 million 
gallons actually produced. This means the extra volume in the advanced mandate that was 
supposed to be filled by cellulosic fuels needed to be made up with BBD and imported sugarcane 
ethanol. In essence it creates a large ‘other’ advanced sector although with the much slower than 
anticipated production of cellulosic biofuels deeper change within the RFS structure may be 
required. Once the advanced mandate has been filled these fuels are able to compete for the total 
renewable mandate with corn ethanol.  
The total renewable fuel mandate had not been altered until 2014 when the EPA 
suggested a lower amount and used ranges because they were not sure what volume was 
acceptable. This has been subject to debate and so is at the time of this writing still under debate 
(even though we are well into 2014) (EPA, 2014). In addition to being lowered, wide ranges 
were provided for total renewable fuels so the exact standard is not known for 2014 (Office of 
Transportation and Air Quality, 2013). The advanced mandate was also lowered even though it 
was met and exceeded by a large amount in 2013. The EPA offered a comment period that ended 
January 28, 2014 that has resulted in thousands of comments sent in to retain the original 
renewable fuel mandated volumes. Many comments are arguing that the EPA does not have the 
ability to change the volumes by improperly interpreting the Clean Air Act waiver authority to 
reduce them. Moving forward the decision will have a large impact of the amount of renewable 
fuels blended in the United States.   
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APPENDIX 2 
EPA Yearly Calculation of Blend Mandates (EPA, 2013) 
𝑆𝑡𝑑𝐶𝐵,𝑖 = 100 ∗
𝑅𝐹𝑉𝐶𝐵,𝑖
(𝐺𝑖 − 𝑅𝐺𝑖) + (𝐺𝑆𝑖 − 𝑅𝐺𝑆𝑖) − 𝐺𝐸𝑖 + (𝐷𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖) + (𝐷𝑆𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷𝑆𝑖) − 𝐷𝐸𝑖
 
𝑆𝑡𝑑𝐵𝐵𝐷,𝑖 = 100 ∗
𝑅𝐹𝑉𝐵𝐵𝐷,𝑖
(𝐺𝑖 − 𝑅𝐺𝑖) + (𝐺𝑆𝑖 − 𝑅𝐺𝑆𝑖) − 𝐺𝐸𝑖 + (𝐷𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖) + (𝐷𝑆𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷𝑆𝑖) − 𝐷𝐸𝑖
 
𝑆𝑡𝑑𝐴𝐵,𝑖 = 100 ∗
𝑅𝐹𝑉𝐴𝐵,𝑖
(𝐺𝑖 − 𝑅𝐺𝑖) + (𝐺𝑆𝑖 − 𝑅𝐺𝑆𝑖) − 𝐺𝐸𝑖 + (𝐷𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖) + (𝐷𝑆𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷𝑆𝑖) − 𝐷𝐸𝑖
 
𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑅𝐹,𝑖 = 100 ∗
𝑅𝐹𝑉𝑅𝐹,𝑖
(𝐺𝑖 − 𝑅𝐺𝑖) + (𝐺𝑆𝑖 − 𝑅𝐺𝑆𝑖) − 𝐺𝐸𝑖 + (𝐷𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖) + (𝐷𝑆𝑖 − 𝑅𝐷𝑆𝑖) − 𝐷𝐸𝑖
 
Where: 
StdCB,i = The cellulosic biofuel standard for year i, in percent. 
StdBBD,i= The biomass-based diesel standard for year i, in percent. 
StdAB,i= The advanced biofuel standard for year i, in percent. 
StdRF,i= The renewable fuel standard for year i, in percent. 
RFVCB,i= Annual volume of cellulosic biofuel required (adjusted) for year i, in gallons. 
RFVBBD,i= Annual volume of biomass-based diesel required for year i, in gallons. 
RFVAB,i= Annual volume of advanced biofuel required for year i, in gallons. 
RFVRF,i= Annual volume of renewable fuel required for year i, in gallons. 
Gi= Amount of gasoline projected to be used in the 48 contiguous states and Hawaii, in year i, in 
gallons. 
Di= Amount of diesel projected to be used in the 48 contiguous states and Hawaii, in year i, in 
gallons.  
RGi= Amount of renewable fuel blended into gasoline that is projected to be consumed in the 48 
contiguous states and Hawaii, in year i, in gallons. 
RDi= Amount of renewable fuel blended into diesel that is projected to be consumed in the 48 
contiguous states and Hawaii, in year i, in gallons. 
GSi= Amount of gasoline projected to be used in Alaska or a U.S. territory, in year i, if the state 
or territory has opted-in or opts in, in gallons. 
RGSi= Amount of renewable fuel blended into gasoline that is projected to be consumed in 
Alaska or a U.S. territory, in year i, if the state or territory opts-in, in gallons. 
DSi= Amount of diesel projected to be used in Alaska or a U.S. territory, in year i, if the state or 
territory has opted-in or opts in, in gallons. 
RDSi= Amount of renewable fuel blended into diesel that is projected to be consumed in Alaska 
or a U.S. territory, in year i, if the state or territory opts-in, in gallons. 
GEi= The amount of gasoline projected to be produced by exempt small refineries and small 
refiners, in year i, in gallons.  
DEi= The amount of diesel fuel projected to be produced by exempt small refineries and small 
refiners in year i, in gallons, in any year they are exempt. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Forecast data used by the EPA to calculate percentage standards 
 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Cellulosic biofuels 0.017 0.006 0.01045 6.000 0.0065 0 0 
BBD 1.28 1.28 1.00 0.80 0.65** 0.50 0 
Advanced biofuel 2.20 2.75 2.00 1.35 0.95 0.60 0 
Total Renewable fuels 15.21 16.55 15.20 13.95 12.95 11.10 9 
Motor Gasoline 132.65 132.80 135.39 139.07 139.20 138.47 144.5 
Motor Diesel 47.12 51.76 50.68 49.21 46.71 0 0 
Renewable fuels to be blended with gasoline 13.12 13.31 13.31 13.45 12.11 11.03 9 
Renewable fuels to be blended with diesel 1.38 1.23 0.93 0.71 0.7665 0 0 
GE* 0 0 4.87 0 0 18.73 19.55 
DE* 0 0 2.28 0 0 0 0 
All volumes are in billion gallons 
*GE and DE are the small refineries who are exempt from the RFS during these years. For 2013 they are assumed to be 0 to protect confidentiality 
 
 
  
66 
REFERENCES 
 
Anderson, S.T. (2011) The demand for ethanol as a gasoline substitute, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management. Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pg 151-168. 
Babcock, B. A. (June 2011). The Impact of US Biofuel Policies on Agricultural Price Levels and 
Volatility. Geneva, Switzerland: ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and 
Sustainable Development; Issue Paper No. 35; ICSTD International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development. 
Babcock, B. A. (2012). Outlook for Ethanol and Conventional Biofuel RINs in 2013 and 2014. 
Ames: Card Policy Brief 12-PB 9. 
Babcock, B. A., Moreira, M., & Peng, Y. (2013). Biofuel Taxes, Subsidies, and Mandates: 
Impacts on US and Brazilian Markets. Ames: Staff Report 12-SR 108. 
Babcock, B.A. and S. Pouliot. (2013). Price It and They Will Buy: How E85 Can Break the 
Blend Wall. Ames: Card Policy Brief 13-PB 11. 
de Gorter, H., D. Drabik, and G.R. Timilsina. (2013). The Effect of Biodiesel Policies on World 
Oilseed Markets and Developing Countries. Policy Research Working Paper #6453, The 
World Bank Development Research Group Environment and Energy Team, May 2013. 
de Gorter, H. and D.R. Just. (2009). The Economics of a Blend Mandate for Biofuels. Amer. J. 
Agr. Econ 91(3): 738-750 
de Gorter, H., D. Drabik, and D.R. Just. (2011). The Economics of a Blender’s Tax Credit versus 
a Tax Exemption: The Case of U.S. “Splash and Dash” Biodiesel Exports to the 
European Union. Oxford Press. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 33(3): 510-
527. 
de Gorter, H., D. Drabik, and D.R. Just. (2013). Policy Implications of high RIN prices and the 
‘blend wall’. Biofuels 4(4): 359-361. 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. (2007). Public Law 110-140.  
Energy Information Administration (EIA). (2014). Renewable & Alternative Fuels Database. 
Accessed June 6, 2014 from http://www.eia.gov/renewable/reports.cfm?t=9999&f=d 
EPA (2008). Revised Renewable Fuel Standard for 2008, Issued Pursuant to Section 211(o) of 
the Clean Air Act as Amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2008. 
Federal Register. Vol. 73, No. 31. [40 CFR Part 80]. 
EPA (2008a). Renewable Fuel Standard for 2009, Issued Pursuant to Section 211(o) of the 
Clean Air Act. Federal Register. Vol. 73, No. 226. [40 CFR Part 80]. 
EPA (2010). Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard 
Program; Final Rule. Federal Register. Vol. 75, No. 58 [40 CFR Part 80] 
EPA (2010a). Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2011 Renewable Fuel Standards; Final 
Rule. Federal Register. Vol. 75, No. 236. [40 CFR Part 80]. 
67 
EPA (2012). Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards; Final 
Rule. Federal Register. Vol. 77, No. 5. [40 CFR Part 80]. 
EPA (2013). Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards; Final 
Rule. Federal Register. Vol. 78, No. 158. [40 CFR Part 80]. 
EPA (2013a). EPA Proposes 2014 Renewable Fuel Standards, 2015 Biomass-Based Diesel 
Volume. Regulatory Announcement EPA-420-F-13-048. 
EPA (2014). 2013 RFS2 Data. Accessed June 6, 2014 from http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/ 
rfsdata/2013emts.htm 
EPA (2014a). 2012 RFS2 Data. Accessed June 6, 2014 from http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/ 
rfsdata/2012emts.htm 
EPA (2014b). 2011 RFS2 Data. Accessed June 6, 2014 from http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/ 
rfsdata/2011emts.htm 
EPA (2014c). 2010 RFS2 Data. Accessed June 6, 2014 from http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels 
/rfsdata/2010emts.htm 
Irwin, S. (2013). Biodiesel Supply, Demand, and RINs Pricing. University of Agricultural and 
Consumer Economics, University of Illinois. (October 24, 2013). Accessed from: 
http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2013/10/biodiesel-supply-demand-rins-pricing.html 
Irwin, S. (2013). More on Ethanol RINs Pricing. University of Agricultural and Consumer 
Economics, University of Illinois. (October 31, 2013). Accessed from: 
http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2013/10/more-on-ethanol-rins-pricing.html 
Irwin, S. and D. Good. (2013) RINs Gone Wild?. University of Agricultural and Consumer 
Economics, University of Illinois. (July 19, 2013). Accessed from: 
http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2013/07/rins-gone-wild.html  
Law School, Cornell University. (2013a). 42 U.S. Code 7547- Regulation of fuels. Retrieved 
from Legal Information Institute: 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7545#o_2_B 
Law School, Cornell University. (2013b). 20 CFR 80.145- How are equivalence values assigned 
to renewable fuel. Retrieved from Legal Information Institute: 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/40/80.1415 
McPhail, L., Westcott, P., & Lutman, H. (2011). The Renewable Identification Number System 
and U.S. Biofuel Mandates. Washington: Economic Research Service/USDA. BIO-03 
Meyer, S. and N. Paulson. (2014). Export Market for US Ethanol. University of Agricultural and 
Consumer Economics, University of Illinois. (March 7,2014). Accessed from: 
http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2014/03/export-markets-for-us-ethanol.html  
Meyer, S., Schmidhuber, J., & Barreiro-Hurle, J. (2013). Global Biofuel Trade: How 
Uncoordinated Biofuel Policy Fuels Resource Use and GHG Emissions. Geneva, 
Switzerland: ICTSD Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development: 
Issue Paper No. 48. 
68 
OPIS. (2014). Oil Price Information Service. 
Schnepf, R., & Yacobucci, B. D. (2013). Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): Overview and Issues. 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 
Thompson, W., Meyer, S., & Westhoff, P. (2009). Renewable Identification Numbers are the 
Tracking Instrument and Bellwether of U.S. Biofuel Mandates. EuroChoices, Vol. 8, 
Issue 3, 43-50. 
Tyner, W.E.. (2009) Big Time Issues Facing the Ethanol Industry. Ethanol Today: October 2009 
Tyner, W.E., and D. Viteri. (2010) Implications of blending limits on the US ethanol and biofuels 
markets. Biofuels 1(2), 251-253 
Tyner, W.E., F. Dooley, C. Hurt, and J. Quear. (2008). Ethanol pricing issues for 2008. 
Industrial Fuels and Power February: pp.50-57. 
Yacobucci, B.D. (2013). Analysis of Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) in the Renewable 
Fuel Standard (RFS). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 
 
